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IN THE SUPREME COU·RT
of the

STATIE OF UTAH
JAMES L. BARKER, JR., TRUSTEE
IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE RAY
DUNHAM, VOLUNTARY
BANKRUPT,
Plaint~!! and Appell.ant,
-vs.-

Case No.
9012

GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA
DUNHAM, HIS WIF·E,
Defendants ~and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is very little, if any, dispute in the facts of this
case. The dispute arises in the interpretation thereof.
Appellant's statement of facts is substantially correct if
the argmnentative 1natter is disregarded. However, the
following brief supplemental statement of facts might be
helpful.
George and Leoda Dunham are in their late fifties
and had worked at various jobs, including the mines and
the railroad prior to the aquisition of the subject propertly up along the Upper Provo River in Summit County
in 1944 (R. 8, 9, 17, 19).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

The property was purchased from Mrs. Kirkpatrick
with $1000 down payment, paid out of Leoda Dunham's
money, with $40.00 a month payable from the income
from the property (R. 133). None of George's money
went into the transaction (R. 20, 56, 133).
Thereafter Leoda Dunham managed the property,
with the help of George who acted as handy man around
the tavern. Various lots were sold from the property,
the deeds for which were prepared for the signature of
both Leoda and George by officers of the Coalville or
Kamas State Bank, and the proceeds from which went
directly to either of the banks to pay an existing mortgage
on the property (R. 133). 'The banks handled all of the
details on these transactions, except the original contact
and showing of the property by either George or Leoda
(R. 139).
George ever since his days with the railroad had been
a heavy drinker spending any money he earned on liquor.
Leoda therefore managed and ran the property c~nsider
ing it as her own (R. 133-139). In October 1952, George
had serious heart attacks sending him to the hospital (R.
68). Because of this illness and on November 1, 1952,
Leoda and George went to Lamar Dlmcan attorney to
have him prepare a deed from George to Leoda and the
deed was prepared, executed and acknowledged on said
date in Mr. Duncan's office (R. 68-70). The deed was
delivered to Leoda ·who placed it in a strong box in her
home at the subject premises (R.137).
Thereafter George and Leoda continued to live on
the premises, Leoda managing and George helping in the
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3
same manner up to the present time (R. 133-138). However, in November 1953 George was involved in an automobile accident as a result of which the creditors, Sizemore and Garrett and George suffered serious injuries
(R. 138). Leoda Dunham, because of the extent of the injuries, recorded the aforesaid deed, which up to that time
she had not recorded not believing it necessary (R. 72).
After the accident, George was left with serious permanent disabilities affecting his memory and speech
(R. 138). Leoda and George from that time on to the
present have lived on the property, Leoda has managed,
George has helped, and additional lots have been sold,
some in the name of both parties and some in the name of
Leoda alone (R. 137, 138). Leoda· continued, as in the
past, to negotiate with the bank in the sale of the various
lots applying the proceeds therefrom, as well as the proceeds from her business to the satisfaction of the mortgage (R. 104) (Ex. 15). Except for the mortgage, George
had no debts when the executed the deed (R. 136, 137).
Mr. Tom Lefler at the Kamas State Bank handled
all of the transactions, and had the mortgages and deed
signed by both George and Leoda, although he knew of
the execution of the deed prior to the accident (R. 98105). This was to conform the documents with the record
title according to the bank's attorney's instructions (R.
105).
ARGUMENT
It is apparent that Appellant is contending that the
trial court has made Findings and Conclusions contrary
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4.

to the evidence. However, Appellant does not point out
any specific deficiencies in the evidence, but merely disagrees with the inferences and conclusions arrived at by
the trial court based upon the evidence of the case. From
the evidence Appellant draws his own inferences, contrary to those of the trial court, and seeks to have this
Court affirm him in his beliefs. The brief is not so much
one seeking redress of error in law, but one seeking retrial of the fact issues. Appellant's theory and argument
in support thereof herein presented is patently contrary
to the many rulings of this Court, some of which are
hereinafter cited.
The following quotation from Parrish v. Tahtaras,
7 Utah 2d 87 is representative of the applicable rule of
law:
"Since the court made findings and entered
judgment based thereon, it is our duty to review
· the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings. In reciting the facts, therefore, we state
them as found by the trial court so long as the
record shows some competent evidence from which
said findings could derive.''
Again, as has been stated in Rummell v. Bailey, 7
Utah 2d 137:
"The rule of review of issues of fact is that
all of the evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom should be taken in
light 1nost favorable to the finding made by the
trial court. And if when so viewed there is substantial support in the evidence for the finding
made, it will not be disturbed."
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Other cases upholding this same principle are McCollum.
v. Clothi·er (Utah) 241 Pac. 2d 465; Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company) 3 Utah 2d 247; Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company) 7 Utah 2d 293; and, Buehner Block
Company v. GlezosJ 6 Utah 2d 226.
Appellant raises no questions of law in his brief, but
rather attempts to construe the facts and the inferences
arising therefrom according to his own theory of fraud.
It must be recognized that fron1 any fact situation, there
might possibly be more than one inference. However, to
have this Court now set aside the trial court's Findings,
would be to hold that no reasonable minds would arrive
at the same conclusions as did the trial court. Such a holding would appear unlikely under the evidence adduced at
the trial.
POINT NO. I
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Appellant's Point No. I is general in nature and does
not pin point any particular reversible error committed
by the trial court, but merely makes an all inclusive
charge as to the insufficiency of the evidence. However,
as one reads through the entire brief, it becomes apparent, that appellant's entire appeal is based upon his disagreement with the trial court's inferences and conclusions
derived from the evidence adduced at the trial. It is not
a question of the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter
of law. This is graphically demonstrated on pages 14
through 18, wherein appellant attempts to disprove the
execution of the deed by parading before this court cer-
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tain "badges of fraud.'' These badges are fraudulent,
only because appellant makes such .an inference from the
facts. His own inferences then, are used by appellant to
disprove uncontradicted evidence of the execution of the
deed.
A.

THE DEED WAS EXECUTED NOVEMBER 1, 1952.

Under the Pre-Trial Order and at the trial, the appellant first had to prove that the deed was not executed
on November 1, 1952. Appellant's own witness, LaMar
Duncan, as well as Mrs. Leoda Dunham and Thomas Lefler, all testified unequivocably that the deed was so executed, acknowledged and delivered on November 1, 1952.
The evidence further showed without contradiction that
the deed was given to Leoda because of George's serious
heart attacks, and that the description was taken from a
Tax Notice (R. 30-34, 94, 95, 102-105, 108, 134-137, 139).
Now, in this appeal, .appellant wants this court to
overrule the trial court's finding that said deed was so
executed, by holding that there was no reasonable evidence to support such a finding, and because the inferences appellant draws from the badges of fraud completely overwhelm said uncontradicted evidence. An examination hereinafter of the so-called badges of fraud very
clearly shows the reasonable basis of the trial court's
:findings. Tllis examination also shows that the only basis
for appellant's position is his attempt to impute dishonesty to attorney LaMar Duncan and to Mrs. Dunham,
which accusations are as unfounded as are the appellant's
general claims of "fraudulent intent" found throughout
the brief.
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1.

GEORGE'S ASSERTION OF TITLE.

Mrs. Dunham negotiated and dealt with the Kamas
State Bank regarding the varios deeds, releases of mortgage, sales and application of the sales proceeds, all in
connection with the various transactions involving sales
of portions of the Property (R. 89, 92-102). There is no
doubt but what George talked with proposed buyers and
showed them around the property (R. 66). However, contrary to appelant's statement and after the deed was recorded, George Dunhan1 did sign a deed (Ex. 11) and
the mortgage (Ex. 11) was prepared by the bank for his
signature (Ex. 14). One deed was executed by Leoda
Dunham alone (Ex.10). Mr. Lefler stated that the reason
for the change in the form of the deed was that the bank's
attorneys required the documents to be executed in accordance with the record title, and, of course, the record
title would only have changed when the deed was recorded November 17, 1953 (R. 94-96, 139).
Other than the difference in the deed forms, prepared by the bank, the evidence shows no great change
in the conduct of the parties after the deed was recorded
as compared to prior thereto (R. 78-80). Leoda from
first to last, paid for the property, managed the property,
dealt with the bank and generally directed George in
whatever he did either as handy man or as contacting
people for the sale of lots. They lived together as husband and wife on the property all of the time. Can it be
said that these facts show George's claim to ownership
contrary to the lower Court's findings. I think not.
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2.

RECORDING PLAT.

Appellant makes a great deal out of the recordation
of the subdivision plat. Plaintiff's witness, the County
Recorder, however, testified that the mere fact that the
stamp on the plat indicated that the document was recorded at the request of a person did not by any means
indicate ownership (R. 130, 131). This is well understood
by anyone who has recorded any documents in the County
Recorder's Office.
3.

PREPARATION OF DEED.

Is it really unusual, as argued by appellant, to have
Mr. Duncan prepare the deed and to have the bank handle
all of the other deeds wherein portions of the property
were sold~ Should not the bank prepare the deeds, handle
the payments thereon, apply the payments to the bank's
mortgage and make partial releases, all in connection
with the bank's interest in the property under its mortgage (R. 89, 96, Ex. 15) and under an assignment of the
lot sale proceeds~
4.

~CONTINUED

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.

Appellant claims that George Dunham retained possession after the execution of the deed. The record is
clear that George lived at the tavern and worked on the
property as a handy 1nan fr01n the time Camp l{ilkare
was purchased up to the present (R ..... ). It would be unusual indeed, to require George to move away or to stop
his work in order to negative fraud.
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5.

DEFENDANT'S CLAIMED ILLNESS.

Was the stroke suffered by George in October, 1952,
merely a claimed illness, as is argued by appellant (R. 68,
135) ~ One only has to observe and talk with Mr. Dunhan1
to understand his physical and mental capabilities, and
the trial court had this opportunity of observation and
appraisal. Should the respondents Dunham be expected
to know the ramifications and legal consequences of joint
tenancy, as is argued by appellant~ Again, an observation of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham, their appearance, demeanor, personality, character and testimony would clearly
answer this question (R. 68). Notwithstanding the trial
eourt's appraisal of the parties, appellant now maintains
that the lower court's opinion as to the parties' testimony
is clearly erroneous, and, in effect, argues that the trial
court should not have believed George and Leoda Dunham
in their respective testimonies, and as a matter of fact,
should not have believed any of the other witnesses, excepting as to testimony in favor of appellant.
6. THE ADEQUACY OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIPTION.

The description on the N overnber 1, 1952 deed was
given to Mr. Duncan by Mrs. Dunham from a Tax Notice
(R. 71). Appellant surely realizes that the property
description on a Tax Notice gives the absolute minimum
by way of descriptive terms, and admittedly does not include water rights or other sirnilar types of appurtenances. Appellant nevertheless argues that the use of the
abbreviated description when compared with the original
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description on the Kirkpatrick deed, which included water
rights, graphically points up fraud on the part of the
defendants.
7.

MR. LAYTON'S S'TATEMENT.

Again the trial court's interpretation of and reliance
upon the testimony of a witness is challenged by appellant. Admittedly, Mr. Layton was not clear in pin pointing the date upon which Mr. Dunham infonned him of
the deed to Mrs. Dunham. At one point, Mr. Layton indicated his conversation was immediately following his
acquisition of his first lot at Camp Kilkare, sometime in
the Fall of 1953 (R. 147, 148). At another time, Mr. Layton indicated that this conversation was at least a year
before the accident (R. 150). The latter testimony would
be consistent with the date of the execution of the deed
and the former testimony would be inconsistent. The trial
court chose to disregard the unconsistency in the testimony (R. 155). Again appellant attempts to argue that
the trial court had no right to either believe or disbelieve
the testimony or portions of the testimony of the witness.
8.

GEORGE DUNHAM'S UNCERTAINTY.

Mr. Dunham was himself frank to admit that he could
not recall the exact circumstances under which the deed
was executed. Such uncertainty is entirely consistent with
Mr. Dunharn's generally clouded memory and physical defects arising not only from his stroke but from the serious
injuries resulting from the accident (R. 19, 28). Again
the trial court had the opportunity to hear the testimony
and to evalue the weight and accuracy thereof. Certainly
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such frankness is not indicative of an intent by Mr. Dunham to falsify the execution date of the deed. It is for
the trial court to draw the inferences from the testimony
and it is not for appellant nor for the writer here to attempt to negative the inferences so drawn.
Is it fair and reasonable to now state that the above
separately stated matters from 1 to 8, are "badges of
fraud"~ Is not each circumstance susceptible of a reasonable inference of rationality, reliability and bona fideness~ Was not the trial court justified in inferring from
these facts that the deed had been executed on November
1, 1952~
None of the inferences drawn by appellant from the
foregoing facts even remotely negative the unquestionable execution of the deed. 'There is reasonable justification for all these matters, completely untainted with
fraud.
B.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATING TO FRAUD.

At Page 19 of appellant's brief, appellant assumes as
a matter of argument that the deed was executed on November 1, 1952, and then contends that notwithstanding
said execution, there is actual fraudulent intent which
brings the conveyance under Section 25-1-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. It is clear that said section requires
"actual intent . . . to defraud either present or future
creditors ... " This section prohibits the finding of intent
based upon a presumption. Appellant, however, although
he calls this actual intent, is suggesting by innuendo and
inference a fraudulent scheme on the part of the re-
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spondents. ·Certainly there can be no suggestion from the
evidence, or any reason for such a suggestion, that fraud
was intended against any present creditors on November
1, 1952. There simply were no present creditors at that
time, other than a few minor current bills owed b},
Leoda Dunham (R. 136, 137). The note and mortgage in
favor of the bank was· admittedly in existence, but ample
security existed to cover the obligation and such a creditor under the circumstances could hardly be classed as
a present creditor of George Dunhan1 (R. 141). The
various conveyances from time to time and the payment
to the bank of the proceeds therefrom certainly indicate
nothing by way of insolvency or fraudulent intent against
present creditors. Mr. Dunham's ill health was and is
the reason for the execution of the deed November 1,
1952.
Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever indicating the possibility or probability of future creditors
on N ovmnber 1, 1952. The accident very obviously was
not anticipated. Mrs. Dunham had been operating Camp
Kilkare for seevral years, had applied the proceeds from
the business to pay off the mortgage and to pay the
current expenses. There is absolutely no factual basis for
argument that there was actual intent to defraud any
future creditors. It would seems quite elen1entary in
showing actual intent to defraud that the defrauding
part~, haYe at least son1e suspicion or anticipation of the
existence of s01ne future creditors 'vho would be subjected to the fraud; or some schenw to defraud future
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creditors generally. Such a showing is 1nanifestly lacking
in this case.
This general rule is stated in 24 A.m. Jur. 285:
"Whereas the familiar indicia or badges of
fraud may in many instances be· relied on by an
existing creditor .as establishing a case for the
granting of relief, it is not sufficient for the subsequent creditor to make out a case ·of merely
constructive fraud, founded on such facts as lack
of consideration or insolvency on the part of the
transferer; he must establish fraud in fact or
actual fraud, and he must assume the burden of
proof in this respect."
Appellant further cites as evidence of the actual intent to defraud, the various "badges of fraud" hereinbefore discussed and from these facts attempts to infer
actual intent. This inference the trial court did not find
and such inferences could not support a finding of actual
intent, in any event.
Appellant cites Section 25-1..:4 and charges that a
conveyance under this section rendering the person insolvent is a fraudulent conveyance. There is no evidence
in this case to indicate the insolvency of Mr. Dunham in
November of 1952. Mrs. Dunham testified that George
had no debts. The record does show, however, a mortgage.
It would be strange indeed were we to say that a mortgagor renders himself insolvent when he conveys prope-rty encumbered by a mortgage by reason of fact that the
mortgage note still remains in his name. Such a conception of the law of insolvency completely ignores the
purpose of a mortgage and the place that the security
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takes in the foreclosure of the mortgage indebtedness.
The property was more than adequate security for the
mortgage as is evident by comparing the original purchase price with the amounts of the mortgages. There
is no evidence to indicate a possible deficiency against
the defendant, George Dunham. As a matter of fact, all
conveyances of the property in the various parcels resulted in payments on the mortgage and Leoda Dunham
herself made mortgage payments out of the income from
the property. Under these facts, wherein lies insolvency~
The matter of consideration is raised in appellant't:
brief in discussing Section 25-1-4. It is clear that the
down payment was made by Leoda Dunham from her
own money. It is further clear that the payments on the
mortgage, the proceeds of which were used to pay the
Kirkpatrick contract, all came from the income from
Camp KilKare and from the sales of portions of the land.
In the case of Schreyer v. Scott, 134 U.S. 955, a case
on all four's with the present one, the United States
Supreme Court held that where the original consideration
is paid by one spouse and the balance of the contract
payments are from the proceeds realized fron1 the property, the full consideration is determined to be that of
the spouse contributing the down payment and the other
person has no interest in the property. The court further
held that under these facts, a conveyance from the husband to the wife of his legal interest, whatever it may
be, is supported by consideration. See also Harbach r.
Ifill, 112 U.S. 144; JJicDonald v. Dezcey, 202 U.S. 529;
Lumpkin v.liicPllee, 286 P.2d 299 (N.l\iex.).
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There was no evidence in this case indicating that
these payments were not made as testified to and it is
difficult to infer from this evidence that there was no
consideration. The trial court did not make such a finding
and if this court now so holds, it would be to disregard
the well accepted principle of law that all inferences
arising from the evidence must be construed in favor
of the trial court's Findings of Fact.
Therefore, under Section 25-1-4, appellant can neither show insolvency nor inadequate consideration. Even
if these elements were present, appellant would only have
shown constructive fraud, rather than actual fraud, and
under the above authorities, as well as the Utah Statutes
above cited, constructive fraud is not sufficient to enable
a subsequent creditor to prevail.
POINT II
FINDINGS OF F A.CT NOS. 4, 5 AND 7 ARE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND 'THE LAW.

The only new matter raised under Point II involves
a question of the adequacy of the consideration passing
from Leoda Dunham to George Dunham in connection
with the November 1, 1952 deed. Appellant states that
there is no evidence to support Findings of Fact Nos.
4, 5 and 7, and that, therefore, there is no pre-existing
consideration passing from the grantee to the grantor.
It is readily apparent in the Findings of Fact that
Paragraph No. 4 relates to the consideration paid by
Leoda Dunham to Carrie Kirkpatrick, and to the application to the purchase price of the proceeds from the lot
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sales. As has been previously indicated, Leoda Dunham
was the owner of the property, took care of the property,
thereafter sold the property, and George Dunham had no
interest therein, other than a legal interest as shown on
the record title. The evidence as to the payments by
Leoda Dunham sufnciently support Finding of Fact No.
4, independent of the consideration question, and also
support a finding of consideration, were such a finding
necessary. See Schreyer vs. Scott, supra. However, consideration is not here necessary to sustain defendants'
position. The mere fact that the deed is not supported by
consideration does not make a fraudulent transaction.
There must be other indications of fraud, including insolvency, sufficient to show actual intent to defraud
future creditors. These matters have been presented
heretofore in respondent's brief.
Our court has stated in Smith v. Edu:ards, 81 rtah
244, that:
"A conveyance ·without consideration is voluntary, but not for that reason alone fraudulent."
The court indicates there n1ust also be insolvency, the
burden of proof of which must be borne by the creditor
seeking to set aside the conveyance. The Court therein
adopts the definition of insolvency set forth in Title 251-1, Utah ·Code Annotated, to-wit:
"A person is insolvent when the present fair
saleable value of his assets is less than the amount
that will be required to pay his probable liability
on his existing debts as they bee01ne absolute and
matured."
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George Dunham, as found by the trial court, had no
interest in the property, other than a legal interest, prior
to the execution of the deed. There is no evidence whatsoever from which one could infer that the execution of the
deed rendered George Dunham insolvent. Any obligation
he had was secured by the mortgage against the property and under the definition above set forth, there would
be no amotmt required to pay his liability as· the debt
became absolute and matured. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the property was not completely
adequate to secure the debt and the burden was on the
plaintiff to show that to he a fact, if such be the case.
The facts ·to the contrary show that the mortgage was
periodically reduced by the payments from the business
and from the sale of the lots.
Appellant relies at great length upon the case of
Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, in support of the proposition that mere oral testimony between relatives will
not sustain a finding that there was past consideration
for the execution of this deed. Appellant quotes at Page
23 from this decision, but very conveniently omits a portion of the quotation indicating that the court had other
facts before it upon which the decision was based. The
omitted portion of the quotation is as follows :
"On the contrary, there are a number of facts
disclosed by the evidence which tend to show that
the mortgage was executed for the purpose of preventing the Walkers from collecting the amount
owing to them by Anthony and Ida Paxton."
The court, in the Paxton case, was not concerned merely
with the lack of consideration, but also found other facts,
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indicating the actual fraudulent intent of the grantor
insofar as existing creditors were affected. Thus the
Paxton case is clearly distinguishable in many respects.
POINT III
APPELLANT RAISES NO NEW MATTER UNDER THIS
POINT 'THA:T HAS NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY DISCUSSED
ABOVE.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULNG AS TO THE TESTIMONY OF MR. DUNCAN.

This Point relates to a portion of the testimony of
Lamar Duncan a witness of Appellant. During the course
of Appellant's counsel's examination of Mr. Duncan,
said counsel undertook a long series of questions, apparently intending to test the memory of Mr. Duncan
relating to certain stipulations in a prior case, involving
Respondents. (R 35-38). Objection was made for the reason that said questioning concerned the contents of the
stipulations, without giving Mr. Duncan the opportunity
of examining them when said stipulations ·were in Court
in the possession of Appellant's counsel. Said objection
w:as sustained and the Court directed counsel for appellants to continue his exan1ination (R. 38). There wa~
no motion to strike any testiinony, but Inerely an objection as to the type of questions being asked. The stipulations were present and should have been used by
Appellants counsel, as the best evidence of their content~.
An examination of the pleadings and of the record
on the Motion To Strike certain other affidavits filed
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in the case, (R. 158-175), shows that said affidavits and
8tipulations in question would have added nothing to the
case and certainly indicate nothing to show the untruthfulness of any testimony of Mr. Duncan relative to the
issues of the case.
It is apparent that counsel for Appellant has at
pages 30-32 of his brief misinterpreted the rulings of the
trial court in this matter. The trial court did not strike
the testimony of Mr. Duncan at all, but sustained an objection because the questioning was improper in asking
Mr. Duncan to recall from memory the contents of a
document which Appellant's counsel had in his possessiOn.
There is manifestly no error in this regard, much
less do we have reversible error committed by the trial
court.
SUMMARY
The execution of the deed from George to Leoda
Dunham can not be challenged by showing inferences of
fraudulent intent. The execution of the deed on November
1, 1952 is an uncontradicted fact and such a fact is not
buried by an avalanche of innuendoes. The deed was
executed and delivered and under the pre-trial order the
Appellant failed to clear the first and most important
hurdle in his case by showing that said deed was not so
executed.
Since the facts show without question the execution
of the deed, the other matters concerning failure of consideration, insolvency and similar 'badges of fraud' need
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not be considered. It is clear that for a subsequent creditor to overthrow a prior conveyance upon the grounds of
fraud, he must pro;ve clearly and convincingly an actual
fraud on the part of the grantor. Badges of fraud, inferences of fraud or constructive fraud are not enouglJ.
Our statute and our case law clearly uphold this rule.
Here, however, there are not even "badges of fraud.''
There was consideration, there was no insolvency, and
the other "badges" such as insufficient descriptions, failure to record and the like was merely misinterpretations
of the evidence by appellant.
The trial court had ample and reasonable evidence
to support its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
and the Supreme Court should give all reasonable inferences in favor of such findings.
The trial court should be affinned in its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHA!I
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
Counsel for Responde·nt
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